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PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
IN LABOR DISPUTES 
Frank E. Cooper* 
T HERE exists gt;:neral agreement that an effective means must be found, in the public interest, to curb strikes in basic 
industries that imperil the national health or safety. This prin-
ciple, indeed, has been a part of our basic law for more than a 
decade. The trouble has been that the limited means provided 
to meet this need fail to give effective expression to the public in-
terest. The only significant remedy is that which the steel strike 
has made so well known: an 80-day injunction followed by an elec-
tion in which the employees may indicate for publicity purposes 
whether they wish to accept the employer's last offer rather than 
continue the strike. 
How are we to bring the force of public opinion to bear, in the 
search for labor peace? This question is at the heart of the most 
impelling domestic problem facing the United States today. 
In the feverish crisis brought on by the 1959-60 strikes, many 
suggested answers were urged. The trouble with most of them is 
that they do not reflect enough of the facets of that many-sided 
composite of views which, in total, represents the true public 
interest. 
Three principal proposals have been widely urged as offering 
a solution to our present unhappy situation. These are (1) bring-
ing "public representatives" into the bargaining process; (2) 
making the antitrust laws applicable to labor unions; (3) creating 
"labor courts" with powers of compulsory arbitration. 
These three proposals may be separately examined, in light 
of the one underlying test: will they effectively subserve the public 
interest in fair settlement of industrial disputes? 
Then, in light of the inadequacies of these proposals, as dis-
closed by such examination, a new approach will be suggested 
which, it is believed, may be effective to protect the interests of 
employees, employers, and - most important - the general public. 
I. THE PUBLIC CANNOT BE BROUGHT INTO THE 
BARGAINING PROCESS 
One frequently-voiced suggestion is that a panel of "public 
representatives" be brought into the bargaining process. This is a 
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comparatively simple and superficially attractive device - it would 
appear to offer a method of bringing representatives of the public 
interest right into the negotiating rooms, to sit at the head of the 
bargaining table. 
But history has shown that this approach does not work. In 
World War II, labor disputes were submitted to tri-partite panels 
of War Labor Board members, comprising equal numbers of labor 
union officials, representatives of company management, and 
"public members." All had an equal vote, and the public mem-
bers had the balance of power. But that power was exercised, in 
too many cases, to effectuate motives that were less than idealistic. 
It is inevitable that it should be so. 
The "public members" did not really represent the public in any 
true sense. They perforce carried with them into the performance 
of their task whatever social and economic ideologies they had 
acquired in their work-a-day jobs. A typical three-member "pub-
lic" panel might be comprised of a college professor, a holder of 
public office, and a professional arbitrator. They could accom-
plish some good by bringing to bear the views of three individuals 
not directly involved in the particular dispute; but they could not 
speak for a hundred million Americans, any more than could a 
panel composed of your letter-carrier, your minister, and your fam-
ily doctor. The best they could do was seek to work out some 
compromise and persuade two of the other six members of the 
Board (three "labor" and three "management") to vote for it. 
Many criticisms were directed toward the public members of 
the War Labor Board panels. Sometimes it was asserted that their 
dominant philosophy was that of peace at any price. Often, the 
"public" members were accused of being too sympathetic to the 
demands of organized labor. Sometimes, they were accused in 
union publications of being too "management minded." It was 
asserted from time to time that particular disputes were settled 
on the basis of political deals, rather than on the basis of an in-
telligent, high-minded, and fully-informed appraisal of what the 
public interest demanded in a particular conflict. 
The War Labor Board experience strongly argues that no small 
group of men can be selected who possess, singly or collectively, 
the wisdom that would be needed to divine what settlement of a 
particular labor dispute would best serve the public interest. Can 
you think of any three men endowed with the prescience to foresee 
what terms of settlement of the steel strike of 1959 would have been 
best for all the people directly or indirectly affected? 
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The most that "public members" can do is to serve as a catalytic 
to compromise. Just as in chemical reactions the catalytic agent 
sometimes forms intermediate compounds that decompose, too 
often the intermediate compromises hammered out in fear of an 
imminent strike have little permanency. They provide only a 
stop-gap solution. More is needed. 
II. THE ANTITRUST LAws ARE INADEQUATE To MEET 
THE PUBLIC NEED 
A second proposal, and one which has wide popular appeal, 
is to make the antitrust laws applicable to labor unions. How-
ever, only the most optimistic can find much comfort in this sug-
gestion. The chief difficulty may be briefly summarized thus: 
While the proposal is based on premises that are logically valid, 
no one has as yet been ingenious enough to devise a practical 
method of applying antitrust sanctions to the monopolistic prac-
tices of labor unions. In short, the theory is good, but its practical 
application involves difficulties not yet solved. The reasons for 
these two conclusions may be separately stated. 
First, the proposals are based on premises that are logically 
valid. Many of the larger labor unions do in fact possess monop-
olistic power. Through their control of the labor supply, they 
are able to, and in too numerous instances have in fact engaged in 
restrictive practices tending to fix prices artificially high, to re-
strict production, to prevent entry by newcomers into certain fields 
of trade and commerce, and to restrain competition. These are 
the classic hall-marks of monopoly power. For more than a half 
century, business concerns exercising such powers have been sub-
ject to severe criminal and civil penalties. There is no logical 
reason why similar legal restraints should not be imposed, in the 
public interest, on labor unions engaged in restraint of trade or 
other monopolistic practices. On the contrary, elementary ideals 
of fair play strongly urge that the same rules of law should apply 
to managers of labor as apply to managers of corporate enterprise. 
Second, despite the logical validity of the proposal that anti-
trust laws should be made applicable to labor unions (as, indeed, 
they had been for many years until the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader1 ), there are 
practical difficulties in applying them. 
1310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
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First, and probably foremost, is the circumstance that the rem-
edies utilized to compel businesses to avoid monopolistic practices 
are inappropriate to the case of the union monopoly. The anti-
trust laws authorize the courts to enter certain types of order only. 
Such orders are well adapted to correct the harm caused when 
business management violates the antitrust laws. But they would 
not work well, if applied to the situation that results when unions 
violate antitrust principles. 
For example, if the bigness of a corporation is utilized as a 
means of accomplishing improper objectives, the courts can order 
a divestiture - can order a big company carved up into smaller 
ones, which then (for such is the nature of business) compete 
vigorously with each other, each striving to earn the most money 
for its owners. But it would scarcely be practicable to split up a 
big union, like the United Steel Workers or the United Auto Work-
ers. For one thing, the court would not know along what lines 
it should be split up - whether it should be along geographical 
lines, or whether there should be a separate union for each type of 
industry, or whether perhaps the size of the unions should be pat-
terned to fit the size of the companies in the industry. 
More important, one wonders what good would be accom-
plished by splitting up a union. Allied unions do not compete 
with each other. Would not a dozen small U.A.W. unions volun-
tarily adopt programs of joint action and mutual assistance so 
effective that their combined monopolistic powers would continue 
unabated? One fears that the chief result of divestiture would 
be to increase the number of full-time, paid union officers, and 
increase other administrative expenses, with the result that each 
worker would have to pay more union dues without receiving 
any corresponding benefit. 
Similarly, injunctive relief is well adapted to antitrust viola-
tions by businesses; but it would not be appropriate in cases where 
unions violate the antitrust principles. For example, if a group of 
companies agree to fix prices, or to divide territories, this can read-
ily be stopped by means of an injunction forbidding them from 
continuing this practice, on pain of fines and jail sentences. But 
how would the injunction be framed where unions were defend-
ants? One of the most potent monopolistic weapons of the big 
union is the practice of throttling a small business by a picket line, 
to compel the employer to accept unreasonable and unduly burden-
some demands. Could the union be enjoined from picketing? 
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In an earlier day, when the federal courts construed the anti-
trust laws as applying to labor union activities, they did under-
take by injunction to limit the picketing activities of unions. But 
the results of these attempts were unsatisfactory; and a growing 
public resentment led finally to the enactment of the Norris-La 
Guardia Act, 2 which so drastically limited the powers of the federal 
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes as to make this device 
practically a dead letter. Further, more recent decisions and legis-
lation have recognized certain rights on the part of unions to picket, 
subject to stated limitations. How, then, could injunctions be used 
to enforce the antitrust laws against labor unions? 
This brings us to the second basic practical difficulty encoun-
tered in any attempt to make the antitrust laws applicable to labor 
unions. Many of the most effective monopolistic practices of the 
unions are now protected by law. The antitrust laws could not 
be made really effective as against unions, unless far-reaching 
amendments were made in many other laws. An outstanding ex-
ample is the device of compulsory membership. This means that 
once a union wins a bargaining election in a plant, it can bargain 
an agreement which requires that all employees in the plant, and 
all who thereafter come to work there, must become dues-paying 
members of the union in order to hold their jobs. Thus the union's 
monopolistic powers over the labor supply in that plant become 
self-perpetuating. This violates the theory of the antitrust laws. 
But the legality of compulsory membership provisions has been 
recognized for many years, and is now specifically protected by 
statute.8 
Similarly, the Taft-Hartley law specifically recognizes and pro-
tects the principle of "majority rule."4 This sounds like a demo-
cratic principle. But in practice it is something less than that. If, 
for example, there are 500 employees in a plant and 300 of them 
vote in a union election (a not unusual percentage) and 151 vote 
in favor of union representation, the result is that thereafter the 
2 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §§101-115. 
s Section 8 (a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (a) (3), provides that it 
shall not be an unfair labor practice to execute a "union shop" contract, requiring union 
membership as a condition of employment. Elimination of earlier provisions, requiring 
an affirmative vote of the employees affected as a condition precedent to the execution 
of such an agreement, has in operation served to encourage the execution of such contracts, 
notwithstanding the provisions of §14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §164(b), 
that federal law shall not be construed as authorizing the execution of "union shop" con-
tracts in states where such agreements are prohibited by state law. 
4 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §159 (a). 
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union which was favored by only 151 employees becomes the ex-
clusive representative of all 500, with sole power to decide (by 
collective bargaining) the conditions under which they shall work, 
and the ways in which their grievances will be handled. 
It would be impossible for the courts to prohibit, as violative 
of the antitrust laws, practices which are specifically made legal by 
other laws. 
In short, while it can readily be agreed that the principle of the 
antitrust laws should be made applicable to labor unions, the prac-
tical difficulties of applying the existing antitrust laws to monop-
olistic labor union practices are so great as to compel the conclu-
sion that new legislation is needed. 
III. "LABOR COURTS" ARE NO SUBSTITUTE 
FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The third principal suggestion proposes to give effect to the 
public interest in the settlement of labor disputes by submitting 
them to a "labor court." Since the American courts have done so 
well in settling all other kinds of disputes, it is said, they could 
presumably do equally well in the area of labor disputes. Imbued 
only with a desire to obtain equal justice for all, it is argued, the 
courts could determine the rights and obligations of the parties 
impartially and fairly. 
This suggestion is specious. The so-called "labor court" would 
not be a court at all, but only a dignified name for a group of arbi-
trators. Courts sit only to determine legal controversies, which can 
be solved by application and adaption of statutes and common-law 
rules. But there are no statutes or common-law rules that tell us 
whether a group of employees deserve a wage increase (and if so, 
how much and how soon) or whether management should have a 
right to cut out "featherbedding" practices under which some em-
ployees are paid for not working. There are no legal rights and 
wrongs in these areas. Such questions must be settled by negotia-
tion and bargaining- or by arbitration. The term "labor court," 
in short, would be merely a euphemistic description of a process of 
compulsory arbitration. Will compulsory arbitration answer the 
problem? Surely not. 
The whole idea of being compelled to submit to the ad hoc dis-
cretionary judgment of an arbitrator ( or even three or four arbitra-
tors) on such basic issues as wages or management prerogative is 
anathema to the managers of unions as well as to the managers of 
business. Neither unions nor companies would be willing to sub-
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mit to compulsory arbitration. This by itself may be unimportant, 
for the rights of the public override those of both contesting parties. 
But it does appear a bit naive to talk seriously of passing a law 
which would be unanimously opposed by both unions and com-
panies, and presumably by the rest of the public as well. Further, 
there are substantial doubts as to the constitutionality of a law that 
would provide for compulsory arbitration. 
More important still, the idea of compulsory arbitration is at 
odds with fundamental concepts of our democratic society. Should 
any man, or any group of men, be vested with plenipotentiary 
power to tell a group of employees that they must continue to work 
without any wage increase although they would rather not work at 
all than continue without an increase, or to tell a company that it 
must give up its right to determine the products it will manu-
facture, or perhaps to impose a retirement plan that is unwanted by 
either employees or employer? Instinctively, most Americans 
would say "No." Substitution of arbitrary discretion for the give 
and take of collective bargaining is not in keeping with American 
traditions, which have long recognized and respected the collective 
bargaining process. Yet this is what any process of compulsory arbi-
tration would involve. America is not ready for it - not yet, at 
least. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS POINTING TO A SURER SOLUTION 
There are two time-tested principles, consistent with demo-
cratic American traditions, that have been quite overlooked in all 
the debates as to how in the public interest we can avoid the disrup-
tions of the national economy that too often accompany major in-
dustrial disputes. 
A. The Public Should Be Told the Facts 
The first of these principles recognizes that, as John Galsworthy 
said long ago, "Public opinion's always in advance of the Law." 
When all the facts of the case are made fully known to the public, 
there emerges with amazing speed a crystallized public opinion that 
truly represents all facets of our great populace. As it emerges, it 
often is indeed in "advance of the Law," as the poet said. But, 
because it is the true public opinion, and recognized as such by 
Congress, it possesses amazing power to modernize the law. Amend-
ments can be enacted speedily when public demand for a change 
is felt. 
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An outstanding instance of the genius of the American people, 
once all the facts are placed before them, to arrive at a common 
judgment as to what changes in the law are required (and speedily 
to obtain enactment of such changes) is afforded by the Labor Re-
form Law of 1959.5 In the early months of 1959, it was commonly 
conceded by practically all who professed special knowledge in the 
matter that none of the pending labor reform bills could be passed 
at the 1959 Session of Congress. The union lobbies were exerting 
such powerful opposition, it was said, that not even a mild bill 
could be passed. However, in the course of a few weeks, as the re-
ports of the McClellan Committee reached their startling con-
clusions, and were carried by newspaper and radio throughout the 
Nation, the public, aroused by the frank and shocking disclosure 
of the facts, demanded action and got it. The enactment of the far-
sweeping provisions of the 1959 law was made possible only because 
of the force of an aroused public opinion, and the public was 
aroused only because all the facts involved had been made public 
knowledge. 
Is it not fair to assume that if all the facts involved in a dispute 
between, say, the United Steelworkers and the major steel com-
panies were made known to the public there would be formulated 
a public opinion as to what settlement terms were right and just 
and fair for the Nation as a whole? Is it not fair to assume that the 
companies and the union would be just as heedful of the true 
public opinion, so expressed, as was the Congress? 
On these assumptions it is urged that the first step toward a 
surer solution of the problem is to adopt an effective method of let-
ting the public know all the facts involved in a labor dispute of 
sufficient stature to imperil the national well-being. 
B. Modern Governmental Techniques Should Be 
Brought To Bear 
The second time-tested principle that should be reexamined in 
the present exigency is that which recognizes the special ability of 
administrative agencies to serve certain governmental purposes 
more efficiently than do the traditional judicial and legislative 
organs. Nearly seventy-five years ago, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was created to work out solutions to baffling problems 
connected with regulation of the railroads - problems that our 
forefathers found as difficult and pressing as today we :find the 
5 73 Stat. 519 (1959), U.S. CODE CONG. and An. NEWS 2953 (Sept. 14, 1959). 
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problems of regulating labor-management relations. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission was empowered to exercise a combina-
tion of legislative, judicial and executive powers that enabled it 
to proceed in an experimental fashion, trying several proposed solu-
tions on a tentative basis until it hit upon one that worked satis-
factorily. So well did this approach work as a means of hammering 
out practical solutions to the problems of railroad regulation, that 
the Interstate Commerce Commission Act became a pattern for 
many subsequent congressional enactments. In 1914, there was 
created a Federal Trade Commission charged with the duty of 
preventing unfair and deceptive methods in competition. In later 
years, a large number of federal administrative tribunals have been 
created for the purpose of policing the minutiae of conduct in some 
designated field affected by the public interest. Thus, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission supervises the issuance and sale of 
stocks and bonds, to protect the public from deceptive practices in 
the stock market. The Civil Aeronautics Board determines what 
routes airplanes may fly, what companies shall operate such routes, 
what planes may be used, and how much fare may be charged. 
The Federal Communications Commission exercises a similar 
supervisory control over radio and television. The Federal Power 
Commission is guardian of the public interest in the production 
and distribution of natural gas. The list could be extended. Sev-
eral score additional examples could be cited where Congress found 
it appropriate and necessary to create an administrative agency as 
a means of providing continuous governmental supervision over 
an area of activity where, in the public interest, regulation ·was 
necessary. 
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, Congress made a start in this 
direction by creating a National Labor Relations Board. How-
ever, its powers were, on the whole, circumscribed somewhat nar-
rowly. It was given power to determine, within prescribed limits, 
how large or small a group of employees constituted an appropriate 
"unit" for collective bargaining purposes, and to determine 
whether a majority of the employees in such "unit" desired to be 
represented by a union. It was given power to prevent the com-
mission of specified unfair labor practices by employers and 
(twelve years later) by unions. Its work, within the rather narrow 
sphere of authority delegated to it, has won the respect of labor, 
management, and the public. Its expertness in dealing with the 
problems entrusted to it has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court which in Phelps Dodge Gorp. v. National Labor 
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Relations Board expressed its deference to the judgment of the 
NLRB by explaining that in the field of labor relations "factors 
outside our domain of experience may come into play."6 
But the Board has never been given a sphere of authority nearly 
as broad in the field of labor relations as the authority delegated 
to other agencies in their respective areas of regulation. Is it not 
time to consider whether the NLRB ( or some independent agency) 
be given broader powers in this area? 
C. Implementing the Program 
The two suggestions above made can readily be combined in a 
single course of action. 
An administrative agency could be created and vested with 
powers to ascertain the facts involved in critical labor disputes and 
the duty of disseminating such facts to the public. The same agency 
could be given powers to exercise certain sanctions designed to 
curb abuses of power by either of the contending parties and (by 
making sure the desires and wishes of the individual employees 
were recognized and protected) to promote the public interest in 
the fair settlement of labor disputes affecting the national interest. 
I. Making the Facts Known 
The steel strike of 1959-1960 furnishes a timely and excellent 
example of the inability of the public - and, indeed, the employees 
directly involved - to learn the facts bearing on the central issues 
in dispute. 
It is well known that one of the principal issues in the steel 
strike concerned the "work rules." But what are the facts of the 
case? One obtained the general impression from advertisements 
published by the companies that they wished to restrain uneco-
nomic "featherbedding" practices. The advertisements published 
by the union warned of the loss of thousands of jobs if the com-
panies won their point. But neither side, so far as the writer has 
discovered, published a sufficient statement of the underlying 
factual circumstances to permit the public to form a judgment on 
the issues. 
It may be assumed that most citizens are unsympathetic with 
unnecessary "make work" practices whereby employees are paid 
for not working or for performing useless tasks. It is fair to assume 
also that public sympathy runs high for men about to lose jobs 
6 313 U.S. 177 at 195 (1941). 
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which have long been recognized as legitimate jobs. But, on the 
basis of the fragmentary information available, the public had no 
means of knowing which side was in the right. 
If an accurate, complete, and impartial statement of all the 
relevant facts had been made known, the public would have formed 
its own conclusion as to how the dispute should have been resolved; 
and there can be little doubt that the force of public opinion would 
have powerfully influenced the negotiating teams, just as it in-
fluenced the Congress which, a few months earlier, was considering 
a labor reform bill. 
Consider, too, the plight of the employee. Had he been asked 
to vote on whether he wished to accept the companies' offer, he 
probably would not have known whether he was one of those who 
would lose their jobs under the companies' proposal. How could 
he intelligently decide how to vote? It would seem that at the very 
least the employee whose future is vitally involved in the out-
come of the dispute should be enabled to learn exactly what is 
involved. 
Presidential fact-finding commissions, given a few days to study 
the situation, at a time when emotional feelings are running high, 
cannot possibly do an adequate job. What is needed is a staff of 
expert fact-finders who would work with both parties day in and 
day out over a longer period of time, and who by careful study of 
the pre-negotiation demands would be able to focus clearly upon 
the facts lying at the heart of the dispute before they became con-
fused in the heat of debate. If empowered to interrogate represen-
tatives of both parties, and to take testimony, and demand the pro-
duction of evidence bearing upon the facts involved in the dispute, 
such an agency could lay before the workers, and the general public 
as well, a clear and authoritative picture of what was really involved 
in the dispute. In the bright light of such fact-finding processes, 
the employees affected could make an intelligent choice, and the 
general public could adequately express its opinion as to how the 
dispute ought to be resolved in the public interest. 
2. Protecting the Public Interest 
The powers of the agency should not be restricted to fact-find-
ing and publicizing. On the basis of the facts found, the agency 
could be empowered by Congress to take appropriate action along 
a number of lines designed to safeguard the collective bargaining 
process and curb monopolistic abuses. 
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(a) Bargaining Units. One of the most significant unsettled 
issues in the field of labor relations concerns the question how big 
the bargaining unit should be. We have all seen how industry-
wide bargaining can and often does produce crises that threaten 
the national economic well-being. We have seen how (in the auto-
mobile industry, for example) bargaining on a company-wide 
basis enables the union to adopt a "divide and conquer" strategy, 
taking advantage of the fierce inter-company competition to 
"knock off" the adversaries one at a time. It requires but little 
imagination to conjecture what havoc could be wrought by a law 
requiring each employer to bargain separately with its own em-
ployees. A group of thirty or forty small tool and die shops in a 
single metropolitan area would be helpless to defend themselves 
against the economic force of a single union representing all em-
ployees of all companies ( even though separate bargaining teams 
were set up on the basis of company units) unless the employers 
were permitted to join forces for bargaining. 
These few instances are enough to suggest that there is no single 
pat answer as to how large a bargaining unit should be. In some 
cases it should be larger; in others, smaller. 
By authorizing a federal administrative agency to determine, 
on a case-by-case basis, what bargaining unit would be appropriate 
to protect the public interest by avoiding situations where unions 
could exercise their economic power in a monopolistic fashion, it 
might be possible to take long steps toward applying to the collec-
tive bargaining process the principle of the antitrust laws, and at 
the same time promote democracy in collective bargaining. 
(b) Strike Votes. The right of employees to strike has long 
been protected by law. Should they not equally have a right not 
to strike? Unfortunately, they do not now in fact have a right to 
refrain from striking. If they are told by union officials that they 
must strike, they have no real alternative but to follow their leader's 
orders. Perhaps it would, as unions argue, hamstring the effective-
ness of union bargaining strategy to adopt a law requiring that 
there must always be a government-conducted strike vote before a 
strike can be called. On the other hand, it must be conceded that 
there are some cases where it would be most beneficial to the em-
ployees concerned, and to the general public as well, to let the 
employees decide for themselves (in light of accurate, complete and 
unbiased statements of the facts involved in the dispute) whether 
or not they wished to go on strike. 
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It is therefore suggested that the federal administrative agency 
here proposed should have power, in those instances where it deems 
such action appropriate in the public interest, to order that no 
strike could be called unless a majority of all the employees in the 
bargaining unit voted in favor of such action at a secret election 
conducted by the government agency after the employees had been 
fully informed of the issues involved and were apprised of all the 
facts bearing on such issue. 
If they voted against striking, collective bargaining would go 
on, and the union would be in the same position that employers 
now are. Employers cannot lock out - this is normally prohibited 
by law. Similarly, the union, if its own members voted against 
strike action, would have to bargain the issue out on the merits as 
employers are now compelled to do. Neither side would be able 
to say: "We won't play ball any more unless you will play our way." 
(c) Miscellaneous Administrative Sanctions. If such an 
agency were created it could be endowed with powers in appro-
priate cases to administer various administrative sanctions (not 
unlike those now exercised by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission) designed to compel good faith bargaining be-
tween evenly-matched parties. It might, for example, be authorized 
to prohibit "union shop" agreements in certain industries. It 
might be empowered, subject to stated criteria, to limit and modify 
the rule that the union is the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees, members and non-members alike. It might require in 
appropriate cases that the union would be permitted to bargain 
only for those employees who were union members, where this 
appeared to be the only way of curbing union monopolies that 
threatened the public interest. Again, it might be empowered, 
where a bargaining deadlock in a basic industry threatened the 
public interest, to determine that the provisions of any such new 
agreement as might be negotiated could not be applied retro-
actively. This would be, indeed, an effective inducement to the 
parties to settle their disagreements speedily. 
All these are but illustrative examples of the way in which an 
administrative tribunal, with appropriately described but clearly 
limited powers, could help avoid crippling strikes without impair-
ing the overall effectiveness of the collective bargaining process 
which still appears to be our best hope for industrial peace. The 
creation of such an agency would contemplate committing the 
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collective bargaining process to evenly-matched teams who would 
carry on their bargaining under conditions that would permit 
employees, stockholders, and the general public to know the facts 
that should be weighed in striking a bargain that would be fair to 
all interested parties, the public included. 
